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Abstract
I study liquidity traps in a model were agents have heterogeneous expectations
and finite planning horizons. Backward-looking agents base their expectations on
past observations, while forward-looking agents have fully rational expectations. Liq-
uidity traps that are fully or partly driven by expectations can arise due to pessimism
of backward-looking agents. Only when planning horizons are finite, these liquidity
traps can be of longer duration without ending up in a deflationary spiral. I further
find that fiscal stimulus in the form of an increase in government spending or a cut in
consumption taxes can be very effective in mitigating the liquidity trap. A feedback
mechanism of heterogeneous expectations causes fiscal multipliers to be the largest
when the majority of agents is backward-looking but there also is a considerable
fraction of agents that are forward-looking. Labor tax cuts are always deflationary
and are not an effective tool in a liquidity trap.
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1 Introduction
A large body of theoretical research has documented the state-dependence of fiscal mul-
tipliers. Christiano et al. (2009), Eggertsson (2011) and Woodford (2011) discuss why
government spending multipliers are larger when the zero lower bound (ZLB) is binding
than otherwise. Erceg and Lindé (2014) find that higher government spending can be
used to shorten liquidity traps and even resolve them immediately if the stimulus is large
enough. By contrast, lowering labor taxes is less effective, because this measure not just
increases output, but also increases labor supply, implying lower wages. The resulting de-
crease in marginal costs for firms puts downward pressure on inflation, possibly increasing
the severity and the duration of the liquidity trap.
So far, the majority of these studies have investigated the effectiveness of fiscal policy
at the ZLB under the assumption of rational expectations and in the case of liquidity
traps that are purely driven by fundamental shocks, i.e., shocks that reduce the natural
rate of interest. An exception is Mertens and Ravn (2014), who investigate the occurrence
of liquidity traps due to the coordination of expectations on a sunspot shock and find
that, there, government spending increases are deflationary while labor tax cuts become
inflationary.
However, a growing strain of the literature has shown the importance of bounded ra-
tionality for macroeconomic policy, especially at the ZLB (see a.o. Williams, 2006, Akerlof
and Shiller, 2010, De Grauwe, 2012 and Gabaix, 2016). In this paper, I therefore study
the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus with different fiscal instruments in liquidity traps that
emerge due to boundedly rational and heterogeneous expectations. In particular, I com-
pare three different types of liquidity traps: fundamentals-driven liquidity traps, where
all agents have rational expectations and a persistent fundamental shock causes a binding
zero lower bound; expectations-driven liquidity traps, that arise under heterogeneous ex-
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pectations when a single non-persistent shock reduces output and inflation expectations
of backward-looking agents; and mixed liquidity traps, where there both is a persistent
fundamental shock and a fraction of backward-looking agents that amplify this shock with
their expectations.
In line with e.g. Orphanides and Williams (2005, 2007), Milani (2007), Slobodyan and
Wouters (2012) and Hommes and Zhu (2014), I find that the presence of backward-looking
agents adds persistence. In both expectations-driven and mixed liquidity traps, this persis-
tence amplification becomes so severe for larger fractions of backward-looking agents that
the economy never recovers. Instead, the economy then ends up in a deflationary spiral.
To tackle this issue, I propose a second intuitive layer of bounded rationality: finite plan-
ning horizons. The first main result of the paper is that relatively small planning horizons
facilitate the existence of expectations-driven and mixed liquidity traps of considerable
duration from which the economy eventually recovers. Such liquidity traps cannot arise
under infinite planning horizons.
More specifically, I model bounded rationality as follows. Instead of being able to
form expectations up to an infinite horizon as is usually assumed, agents in my model
are relatively short-sighted and are able to plan ahead and form expectations only up
to T periods into the future, as in Lustenhouwer and Mavromatis (2017) and Woodford
(2018). Moreover, only a fraction of agents in the modeled economy form expectation in a
forward-looking, rational manner. The other fraction of agents use a backward-looking rule
of thumb, according to which all variables will mean-revert back to their steady state in
the future. Such rule of thumb behavior, used by e.g. Branch and McGough (2009, 2010)
and Gasteiger (2014, 2017), who label it adaptive expectations, is found to be consistent
with expectations of human subjects in laboratory experiments (see e.g. Assenza et al.
(2014) and Pfajfar and Zakelj, 2011) as well as with survey data (see e.g. Branch (2004,
2007)). Other works with similar heterogeneous expectations frameworks include Elton
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et al. (2017), Massaro (2013) and Deák et al. (2017). In terms of micro-foundations and
aggregation of heterogeneous expectations the current paper is also related to these three
papers. However, these papers assume that agents form their expectations over an infinite
planning horizon, while my approach builds on the micro-foundations under finite planning
horizons of Lustenhouwer and Mavromatis (2017) and Woodford (2018). To the best of
my knowledge, this paper is the first to combine heterogeneity in expectations with a
micro-founded framework of finite planning horizons.
Regarding the effects of government spending in expectations-driven liquidity traps,
Evans et al. (2008), Evans and Honkapohja (2009) and Benhabib et al. (2014) find that
under homogeneous adaptive learning, large enough government spending increases can
always prevent deflationary spirals that would otherwise have arisen because of the ZLB.
This result is confirmed by Hommes et al. (2015), who conduct a laboratory experiment,
where, rather than making any assumptions on agent’s expectations, they let expectations
be formed by human subjects in the laboratory. Without fiscal intervention, deflationary
spirals regularly occur in their experiment. However, in treatments where there is a fiscal
switching rule and government spending is increased when inflation is below some threshold,
deflationary spirals are always prevented. This is in sharp contrast with Mertens and Ravn
(2014), who find that, contrary to widely held views, in their sunspot equilibria, increasing
government spending at the zero lower bound is deflationary and is not very effective in
mitigating a liquidity trap.
I confirm the results of the former papers and find that government spending increases
are effective in ending liquidity traps and preventing deflationary spirals. Additionally, I
show that the government spending multipliers become even larger under heterogeneous
expectations. They are the largest when the fraction of backward-looking agents is rela-
tively large but there also still is a significant fraction of forward-looking agents. Under
this mixture of heterogeneous expectations, the following feedback mechanism arises. First,
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forward-looking agents expect the fiscal stimulus package to lead to higher inflation and
output in the future, which leads them to increase their current consumption and prices.
Next, backward-looking agents observe the resulting higher output and inflation and adjust
their expectations and consumption and prices in subsequent periods. But this is already
anticipated by forward-looking agents at the beginning of the liquidity trap, leading to an
even higher initial increase in output and inflation and an even larger subsequent response
of backward-looking agents. This feedback mechanism is present both in expectations-
driven and in mixed liquidity traps.
I further find that labor taxes are deflationary in any type of liquidity trap and, depend-
ing on the fraction of backward-looking agents, even result in positive multipliers. Labor
tax cuts are, therefore, not an effective stimulus tool in liquidity traps with bounded
rationality and heterogeneous expectations. This is further indication that the reversal
of traditional results found by Mertens and Ravn (2014) is not a general feature of liq-
uidity traps driven by expectations, but depends crucially on the choice of modeling an
expectations-driven liquidity trap as a sunspot equilibrium. When, instead expectations-
driven liquidity traps are modeled using bounded rationality, fiscal instruments behave
more in the way economic intuition would indicate.
Finally, I also consider cutting consumption taxes as a tool for fiscal stimulus. Unlike a
cut in labor taxes, I find that a cut in consumption taxes is inflationary and can consider-
ably reduce the duration of an expectations-driven liquidity trap. For fundamentals-driven
liquidity traps, similar findings are presented in Eggertsson (2011), Coenen et al. (2012)
and Correia et al. (2013). However, this paper is the first to study consumption tax cuts in
expectations-driven liquidity traps and/or with bounded rationality. Under the benchmark
calibration, I find multipliers for consumption taxes to be somewhat smaller (in absolute
value) than those of government spending. However, the size of consumption tax multipli-
ers is affected in the same way by the feedback-mechanism described above, and multipliers
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become considerably bigger than 1 (in absolute value) for large, but not too large fractions
of backward-looking agents.
Apart from the papers mentioned earlier , related works with finite planning horizons
include Branch et al. (2013) and Evans et al. (2019). Heterogeneous expectations in new
Keynesian models have further been studied in amongst others Kurz et al. (2013), Pecora
and Spelta (2017) and De Grauwe and Ji (2019). To the best of my knowledge, no paper
with heterogeneous expectations or finite planning horizons studies fiscal policy under the
zero lower bound, though.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model and
expectation formation processes are outlined. In Section 3, I present how different types of
liquidity traps can occur under heterogeneous expectations and show that liquidity traps
of longer duration only arise under finite planning horizons. In Section 4, the effectiveness
of different fiscal stimulus packages is investigated. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model is made up by a continuum of households i ∈ [0, 1], a continuum of firms
j ∈ [0, 1] and a monetary and fiscal authority. Moreover, there are two types of households
and firms. A fraction α of households and firms forms expectations in a backward-looking
manner and a fraction 1− α forms expectations in a forward-looking manner. The expec-
tations of these two types of households and firms will be specified in Section 2.4. Section
2.1 presents the optimization problem and first order conditions of households, Section 2.2
that of firms, and the government sector, monetary policy rule and market clearing are
presented in Section 2.3. In Appendix B the model is log-linearized and aggregated.
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2.1 Households
Households want to maximize their discounted utility over their planning horizon (T peri-
ods), and they also value the state they expect to end up in at the end of these T periods
(their state in period T+1). They are not able to rationally induce (by solving the model
forward), how exactly they should value their state in period T+1. Instead, households
use a rule of thumb to evaluate the value of their state (their wealth). As in Lustenhouwer
and Mavromatis (2017) and Woodford (2018), their objective function therefore exists of a
sum of utilities, U(·), out of consumption and leisure for the periods within their horizon,
as well as an extra term with a function V (·) that is increasing in end of horizon wealth:
max
Ci,Hi,Bi
E˜it
[
t+T∑
s=t
βs−tξsU(Cis, H
i
s) + β
T+1V
(
Bit+T+1
Pt+T
)]
, (1)
subject to
(1+τ cτ )PτC
i
τ +
Biτ+1
1 + iτ
≤ (1−τ lτ )WτH iτ +Biτ +PτΞτ−PτLSτ , τ = t, t+1, ...t+T. (2)
Here Bit are nominal bond holdings from household i at the beginning of period t; C
i
τ and
H iτ are the household’s consumption and labor; Ξt are real profits from firms which are
equally distributed among households; τ cτ and τ
l
τ are respectively the consumption tax and
labor tax rates; LSτ denotes lump sum taxes; iτ is the nominal interest rate; Pτ is the
price level; and Wτ is the nominal wage rate. Finally β is the household’s discount factor,
while ξτ is an exogenous preference shock.
Dividing the budget constraint by Pτ gives
(1 + τ cτ )C
i
τ +
Biτ+1
(1 + iτ )Pτ
≤ (1− τ lτ )wτH iτ +
Biτ
Pτ
+Ξτ −LSτ , τ = t, t+ 1, ...t+ T. (3)
It is assumed that households have CRRA preferences for consumption and labor, so
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that
U(Cis, H
i
s) =
(Cis)
1−σ
1− σ −
(H is)
1+η
1 + η
. (4)
Moreover, the functional form of V (.) is given by
V (x) =
1
1− β
[
1
1− σ
(
Λ
1 + τ¯ c
+
1− β
1 + τ¯ c
x
Π¯
)1−σ]
, (5)
with Λ = (1− τ¯ l)w¯H¯ + Ξ¯ equal to steady state net income.
Equation (5) is (dropping terms independent of x) the continuation value that solves
the Bellman equation
V (x) = max
c
{U(C, H¯)+βV (x′)}, s.t. x′ = Π¯
β
[
(1− τ¯ l)w¯H¯ + x
Π¯
+ Ξ¯− L¯S − (1 + τ¯ c)C
]
.
(6)
Similar to Woodford (2018), this optimization problem gives the optimal intertemporal
consumption decision of households assuming that taxes, wages, hours worked, inflation,
interest rates and profits are all in steady state. That is, the only variables that are allowed
to vary under this optimization problem are consumption (C) and debt (x =
Bit+T+1
Pt+T
).
Under this way of deriving (5), agents are not sophisticated enough to plan how their
hours worked, wages and aggregate variables like inflation, interest rates and profits would
change after their horizon if they would vary their consumption plan after their horizon.
However, using this Value function in Equation (1), households make fully optimal
decisions in steady state. Moreover, V (x) is increasing in x. Therefore, agents realize
that holding more bonds at the end of their horizon will result in more utility. The value
function hence captures partly how future utility depends on end-of-horizon wealth, but in
a boundedly rational manner that only approximates the true value function.
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The first order conditions of the maximization problem (1) subject to (3) are
ξτ (C
i
τ )
−σ = λiτ (1 + τ
c
τ ), τ = t, t+ 1, ...t+ T, (7)
ξτ (H
i
τ )
η = λiτ (1− τ lτ )wτ , τ = t, t+ 1, ...t+ T, (8)
λiτ = βE˜
i
t
(1 + iτ )λ
i
τ+1
Πτ+1
, τ = t, t+ 1, ...t+ T − 1, (9)
λit+T = β(1 + it+T )
1
Π¯(1 + τ¯ c)
(
Λ
1 + τ¯ c
+
1− β
(1 + τ¯ c)Π¯
Bit+T+1
Pt+T
)−σ
, (10)
Next, we define a measure of real bond holdings, scaled by steady state output: bt =
Bt
Pt−1Y¯
. Substituting for this expression in (10) and (3) gives
λit+T = β(1 + it+T )
1
Π¯(1 + τ¯ c)
(
Λ
1 + τ¯ c
+
1− β
(1 + τ¯ c)
Y¯ bit+T+1
Π¯
)−σ
, (11)
and
(1 + τ cτ )C
i
τ + Y¯
biτ+1
1 + iτ
≤ (1− τ lt )wτH iτ +
Y¯ biτ
Πτ
+Ξτ − LSτ , τ = t, t+ 1, ...t+ T. (12)
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of firms producing the final differentiated goods. Each firm has a
linear technology with labor as its only input,
Yt(j) = Ht(j). (13)
There is monopolistic competition and it is assumed that in each period a fraction (1−ω)
of firms can change their price, as in Calvo (1983).
Each firm is run by a household and follows the same heuristic for prediction of future
variables as that household in each period. Moreover, firms are also short sighted. That is,
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they will form expectations about their marginal costs and the demand for their product
for T periods ahead only. However, as in the case of the household problem, firms also care
about their state at the end of the horizon, and consider the possibility that they might
then still be stuck with the price that they set now. The problem of firm j that can reset
its price is then to maximize the discounted sum of its expected future profits within its
horizon plus its perceived value of its state at the end of the horizon. In utility terms, and
using the demand for good j, this can be written as
E˜jt
(
T∑
s=0
ωsβsλjt+s
[(
pt(j)
Pt+s
)1−θ
Yt+s −mct+s
(
pt(j)
Pt+s
)−θ
Yt+s
]
+ ωT+1βT+1V˜ (
pt(j)
Pt+T
)
)
,
(14)
where λjt is the Lagrange multiplier of the utility optimization problem of the household
(j) that runs firm j.
As in Woodford (2018), V˜ (·) describes the continuation value of real profits in utility
terms as a function of the relative price. As in case of the household, this value function
is obtained from the assumption that all variables other than the relative price of the
firm (such as output, wages and the aggregate price level) are in steady state. This value
function therefore satisfies
V˜ (r) = λ¯
(( r
Π¯
)1−θ
Y¯ −
( r
Π¯
)−θ
Y¯ m¯c
)
+ ωβV˜ (
r
Π¯
) + (1− ω)βV˜ opt, (15)
where V˜ opt is next period’s value for a firm that can re-optimize next period. Since V˜ opt
does not influence the current decision problem of the firm (since it is independent of r),
I ignore it and let the functional form of V˜ (r) be
V˜ (r) =
1
1− ωβΠ¯θ−1 λ¯
( r
Π¯
)1−θ
Y¯ − 1
1− ωβΠ¯θ λ¯
( r
Π¯
)−θ
Y¯ m¯c. (16)
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The first order condition for maximizing (14) with respect to pt(j) then is
E˜jt
T∑
s=0
ωsβs
λjt+s
Pt+s
Yt+s
[
(1− θ)
(
p∗t (j)
Pt+s
)−θ
+ θmct+s
(
p∗t (j)
Pt+s
)−1−θ ]
(17)
+(ωβ)T+1
λ¯
Π¯Pt+T
Y¯
[
1− θ
1− ωβΠ¯θ−1
(
p∗t (j)
Π¯Pt+T
)−θ
+
θm¯c
1− ωβΠ¯θ
(
p∗t (j)
Π¯Pt+T
)−1−θ ]
= 0,
where p∗t (j) is the optimal price for firm j if it can re-optimize in period t.
Next, turn to the evolution of the aggregate price level. I assume that the set of firms
that can change their price in a period is chosen independently of the type of the household
running the firm, so that the distribution of expectations of firms that can change their
price is identical to the distribution of expectations of all firms. Since decisions of firms
only differ in so far as their expectations differ, it follows that the aggregate price level
evolves as
Pt = [ωP
1−θ
t−1 + (1− ω)
∫ 1
0
p∗t (j)
1−θdj]
1
1−θ . (18)
2.3 Completing the model
The government issues bonds and levies labor taxes (τ lt ), consumption taxes (τ
c
t ) and lump
sum taxes (LSt) to finance its (wasteful) spending (Gt). Its budget constraint is given by
Bt+1
1 + it
= PtGt − τ ltWtHt − τ ct PtCt − PtLSt +Bt, (19)
with Ht =
∫
H itdi and Bt =
∫
Bitdi aggregate labor and aggregate bond holdings respec-
tively. Dividing by Y¯ Pt gives
bt+1
1 + it
= gt − τ ltwt
Ht
Y¯
+ τ ct
Ct
Y¯
− LSt
Y¯
+
bt
Πt
, (20)
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where bt = BtPt−1Y¯ and gt =
Gt
Y¯
are the ratios of debt to steady state GDP and government
expenditure to steady state GDP, respectively.
Market clearing is given by
Yt = Ct +Gt = Ct + Y¯ gt. (21)
gt, τ lt and τ
c
t can be set in a discretionary manner by the government to counteract
liquidity traps. Only lump sum taxes, LSt, adjust to stabilize debt,
LSt = L¯S
(
bt
b¯
)γLS
. (22)
The monetary policy rule is given by
1 + it = max
(
1, (1 + i¯)
(
Πt
Π¯
)φ1 (Yt
Y¯
)φ2)
. (23)
2.4 Expectations
There are two types of agents in the economy: forward-looking agents and backward-
looking agents. Forward-looking agents are assumed to form fully rational expectations.
Backward-looking agents, on the other hand, consider the last observation of all vari-
ables, and consider this observation to be most informative about the current state of the
economy, and its future evolution. They, however, do not expect the economy to stay in its
current state forever, but instead expect mean-reversion to the target steady state in the
future. Their expectations about government spending s periods from now are therefore
given by
Ebt g˜t+s = ρ
s+1g˜t−1 (24)
Branch and McGough (2010) and Gasteiger (2014) and others refer to these expectations
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as adaptive expectations. Expectations about output, inflation, debt, the nominal interest
rate, taxes and price dispersion are formed analogously.
However, as will be discussed below, I allow for a shock to output and inflation expec-
tations of backward-looking agents, ˆt. This shock, lets them form expectations as if they
observed past output that was ˆt higher than it actually was. For simplicity, it is assumed
that these shocks affect all individual backward-looking agents equally. The output and
inflation expectations of all backward-looking agents then become
Ebt Yˆt+s = ρ
s+1(Yˆt−1 + ˆt) (25)
Ebt pˆit+s = ρ
s+1(pˆit−1 + ˆt) (26)
3 Liquidity traps
In this section, I show that in the above model with forward-looking and backward-looking
agents, different types of liquidity traps may arise. In particular, there can be liquidity
traps purely driven by fundamentals, purely driven by expectations, or partly driven by
fundamentals and partly by expectations. I will refer to these three types as ’fundamentals-
driven liquidity traps’, ’expectations-driven liquidity traps’ and ’mixed liquidity traps’.
Purely fundamentals-driven liquidity traps can only arise when all agents in the econ-
omy are forward-looking. A liquidity trap then arises when the economy is hit by a per-
sistent shock to the fundamentals of the economy. The shock chosen to illustrate this case
is a persistent negative preference shock that creates a desire to save (ξt in Equation (1)).
Similar shocks are used to model a liquidity trap by e.g. Eggertsson (2011) and Mertens
and Ravn (2014).
In contrast, purely expectations-driven liquidity traps can arise only if there is a con-
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siderable fraction of backward-looking agents in the economy, and if the expectations of
these agents are hit by a non-persistent negative shock. In order to highlight the role of
expectations and keep the analysis as general as possible, I initiate such a liquidity trap
by a shock directly to both output and inflation expectations (ˆt in Equations (25) and
(26)). The initial fall in expectations could then be though of as having been caused by
a single, non-persistent shock to fundamentals, but one could also imagine that the fall
in expectations was caused by something outside the model such as a global panic, or a
financial crash.
The intuition for an expectations-driven liquidity trap of multiple periods to arise in
the behavioral model, even after a non-persistent shock to expectations, is the following.
Because of low output and inflation expectations, agents reduce consumption and prices,
so that output and inflation fall. This reinforces the low expectations of backward-looking
agents, and the liquidity trap continues.
Finally, mixed liquidity traps can arise if the economy is a hit by a persistent funda-
mental shock and part of the agents in the economy are backward-looking. In this case,
the persistent fundamental shock causes a liquidity trap of multiple periods to arise, but
the liquidity tap is made worse and lasts longer because of pessimistic expectations of
backward-looking agents.
Below, I start with infinite planning horizons, and compare the standard fundamentals-
driven liquidity traps with mixed and expectations-driven liquidity traps in Section 3.2. I
then show in Section 3.3 that the deflationary spirals that often arise for the latter two
cases largely disappear when agents have a short rather than an infinite planning horizon.
Instead, liquidity traps of longer duration from which the economy can eventually recover
now arise. The mechanisms behind such liquidity traps are illustrated in Section 3.4. First,
the parameterization is discussed in Section 3.1.
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3.1 Parameterization
In the model, one period corresponds to one quarter. I set the discount factor to β = 0.99,
the coefficient of relative risk aversion to σ = 1.5, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply to η = 2, the elasticity of substitution to θ = 6 and the Calvo parameter to
ω = 0.75. These values are relatively standard in the literature.
Steady state fiscal variables are chosen more or less in line with US historical averages as
follows: steady state government spending as a share of GDP is set to g¯ = G¯/Y¯ = 0.3; the
steady state labor and consumption tax rate are set to respectively τ¯ l = 0.2 and τ¯ c = 0.08,
and steady state lump sum taxes are set to L¯S = 0.08. The inflation target is set to 2%.
Other monetary and fiscal policy parameters are set to φ1 = 1.5 and φ2 = 0.157 (implying
a response to output of around 0.6 when annual data are used) and γLS = 1.
I further set the mean reversion in the expectations of backward-looking agents to
0.8. With that calibration, backward-looking agents expect the deviation of variables from
steady state to have reduced to one tenth of the current deviation after approximately 10
quarters. The autocorrelation parameter in the preference shock is also set to 0.8.
3.2 Durations of liquidity traps
First, consider the case where agents have an infinite planning horizon. This allows us
to study, in isolation, the effect of heterogeneous expectations on the duration of liquidity
traps. I do so for two cases: persistent negative preference shocks and non-persistent shocks
to expectations.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 corresponds to the case of a persistent negative preference shock.
Let’s start with only the most left part of the panel. Here, there are no backward-looking
agents. That is, all agents have fully rational expectations as well as a (standard) infinite
planning horizon. Liquidity traps that arise here are fundamentals-driven liquidity
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traps. The duration of these liquidity trap will, of course, depend on the size of the
persistent shock that hits the economy. The size of this shock is varied along the y-axis of
the Figure (where its absolute value is displayed). Darker shades of gray inside the figure
indicate longer liquidity traps. It can, therefore, be concluded that, for the shock sizes
considered here, the duration of the fundamentals-driven liquidity trap varies from 2 to 7
periods.1
As we move to the right in Panel (a) the fraction of backward-looking agents is gradually
increased form 0 to 1 (along the x-axis). The interior of the panel therefore corresponds
to mixed liquidity traps. For most shock sizes, moving to the right in the panel does
not results in longer liquidity traps from which the economy eventually recovers (darker
shades of gray). Instead, as the fraction of backward-looking agents is increased further, a
deflationary spiral arises from which the economy never recovers. This is indicated by the
fully white area in the top right part of the panel.
Next, consider panel (b) of Figure 1. Here, there is no shock to fundamentals. Instead,
there is a single, non-persistent shock to the output and inflation expectations of backward-
looking agents. As a consequence, no liquidity trap arises when the fraction of backward-
looking agents is small, even for very large shock sizes. For larger fractions of backward-
looking agents, liquidity traps do arise. These are expectations-driven liquidity traps.
As was the case for mixed liquidity traps, above, larger fractions of backward-looking agents
quickly lead to deflationary spirals, and intermediate cases where liquidity traps last for
more than three or four periods but do not end up in an deflationary spiral do not occur.
1The duration of the liquidity trap for different shock sizes and different fractions of backward-looking
agents are each time calculated with a single simulation where the shock that initiates the liquidity trap is
the only shock innovation. These simulations therefore are deterministic. This can be done in this manner
since the only nonlinearity in the log-linearized model is the zero lower bound. Therefore, the model is
monotonic in further shock innovations. Obtaining durations of liquidity traps after a single (possibly
persistent) shock hence gives the same result as simulating the model many times with different further
shock innovations and using medians to obtain the duration of the liquidity trap. The latter will, however,
be done later on to calculate the 0.05 and 0.95 quantiles in illustrative simulations.
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Figure 1: Durations of liquidity traps for different fractions of backward-looking agents (x-axis)
and different shock sizes sizes (y-axis) when agents have infinite planning horizons.
Panel (a) captures both fundamentals-driven and mixed liquidity traps, while Panel
(b) captures expectations-driven liquidity traps. Darker color shades indicate a longer
duration of the liquidity trap. The fully white areas in the top right indicate defla-
tionary spirals.
3.3 Deflationary spirals and planning horizons
Above, we found that larger fractions of backward-looking agents in mixed or expectations-
driven liquidity traps do not lead to longer liquidity traps from which the economy even-
tually recovers but, instead, to deflationary spirals. The intuition for such a deflationary
spiral to arise is that backward-looking agents expect low inflation, low output and high
real interest rates for many future periods and hence reduce prices and consumption with
considerable magnitude. When there are enough backward-looking agents in the economy,
the resulting drop in inflation and output is enough to make agents even more pessimistic
in the next period, causing inflation and output to keep falling further and further.
This mechanism, however, crucially depends on agents first being able to form concrete
expectations also about periods that are relatively far in the future and then being able to
include all future periods in their optimization problem. Only under these two assumption
will their current decisions be affected by what they believe will happen in all future
periods.
Results can become quite different if agents have finite planning horizons due to limited
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cognitive ability. If agents are not able to form detailed expectations about periods that
are more the T periods in the future and/or are not able to let these expectations enter
their current optimization problem in a sophisticated manner, then current consumption
and pricing decisions will not be impacted so much by pessimistic expectations about the
future. As a consequence, output and inflation will fall less in the subsequent period,
limiting the continuation of severe pessimism and possibly averting a deflationary spiral.
Figure 2 shows that this is indeed the case for T = 4.2 The figure reproduces Figure
1 but now with agents having a finite planning horizon of 4 periods. It can immediately
be seen in the figure that the white areas where deflationary spirals occur have become
smaller. Moreover, the largest effect occurs for very large fractions of backward-looking
agents (most right parts of both panels). Instead of deflationary spirals, long lasting
liquidity traps (dark shades of gray) arise here for larger shocks.
That is, when agents have finite (small) planning horizons and there is a large fraction
of backward-looking agents in the economy, long lasting expectation driven and mixed
liquidity traps can arise from which the economy eventually recovers. This in contrast
with the case of infinite planning horizons for which large fractions of backward-looking in
combination with larger shocks always lead to deflationary spirals. This is the first main
result of the paper.
3.4 Illustration of expectations-driven liquidity traps
To get further intuition in long lasting liquidity traps from which the economy eventually
recovers, Figure 3 presents impulse response functions of such a liquidity trap. Here, the
2Four quarters might seem like a relatively small number, but survey evidence suggests that many
households might indeed have such short planning horizons. For example, Fulda and Lersch (2018) present
the results of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, where the mean
response to the financial planning horizon is between “The next few months” and “The next year”. Hong
and Hanna (2014) report a somewhat longer median response of “the next few years” in the Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF). However, also here, over 20% gave “the next few months” as a response.
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Figure 2: Durations of liquidity traps for different fractions of backward-looking agents (x-axis)
and different shock sizes sizes (y-axis) when agents have a finite planning horizon
of T = 4 periods. Panel (a) captures both fundamentals-driven and mixed liquid-
ity traps, while Panel (b) captures expectations-driven liquidity traps. Darker color
shades indicate a longer duration of the liquidity trap. The fully white areas in the
top indicate deflationary spirals.
fraction of backward-looking agents is set to 0.8 and the size of the negative shock to
expectations to 0.11 which is equivalent to a reduction of last periods output and inflation
of 11% (see equations (25) and (26)).
Due to the nonlinearity of the zero lower bound, the exact impulse responses depend
on the realizations of further shock innovations. To give an indication of the paths of
endogenous variables that might arise, I generate 1000 sequences of different random draws
of the preference shock innovations along the simulation path.3 For each of the 1000
random sequences, I simulate the model once with the negative shock to expectations and
once without, in order to then subtract the later time series from the former. The solid
curves in Figure 3 correspond to the median of the resulting 1000 impulse responses and
the dotted curves depict the 0.05 and 0.95 quantiles. Note that the median responses are
equal to the responses that are obtained in a deterministic simulation without preference
shocks (see footnote 1).
The bottom two panels show the one-period-ahead expectations of backward-looking
agents in purple. It can be seen that, due to the shock, one-period-ahead expectations of
3The standard deviation of these shock innovations is set to 0.5%.
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Figure 3: Expectations-driven liquidity trap for T = 4 and ˆ1 = −0.11 and 80% backward-
looking agents. The blue solid curves in the top panels depcits median impulse re-
sponses of actual output and inflation. The dashed purple curves represent time paths
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0.05 and 0.95 quantiles.
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backward-looking agents suddenly become low in period 1. As a consequence, backward-
looking agents want to reduce their consumption and prices. Since the zero lower bound
becomes binding, the interest rate is not reduced enough to stabilize output and inflation
and both fall considerably in period 1 (top two panels). In period 2, this causes backward-
looking agents to still have low output and inflation expectations, even though the shock
to their expectations is over.
Forward-looking agents anticipate this lower path of actual output and inflation and also
reduce their expectations in period 1. This is illustrated in the blue curves in the bottom
panels that show the one-period-ahead expectations of forward-looking agents. Comparing
the blue and purple curves, it can be seen that inflation expectations of both agent types
are very similar in period 1. This indicates that the pessimistic inflation expectations of
backward-looking agents become self-fulfilling.
In the end, output and inflation slowly recover, and the zero lower bound remains bind-
ing for 5 periods. If the fraction of backward-looking agents were larger, their expectations
would become even more self-fulfilling implying slower recovery and a longer liquidity trap.
Finally, the dashed purple curves in the top panels correspond to the path of inflation
that backward-looking agents expect at different points in time. Since agents have a
planning horizon of T = 4, each purple curve spans four future periods. If agents would
instead have had infinite planning horizons, they would form pessimistic expectations (and
base their current decision on these expectations) also for periods further in the future.
This would lead them to reduce consumption and prices considerably more in period 1.
Their expectations in period 2 would then become even lower than in period 1, and a
deflationary spiral would be unavoidable.
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4 Fiscal stimulus in a liquidity trap
This section focuses on whether fiscal stimulus in the form of a temporary increase in
government spending or cut in labor or consumption taxes can mitigate liquidity traps. In
particular, assume that the government reacts to the start of the liquidity trap by imple-
menting a stimulus package one period later. Forward-looking agents are further assumed
to anticipate the coming stimulus package already in the first period of the liquidity trap.
Finally, the stimulus package will be persistent, with auto-correlation coefficient 0.7.
In Section 4.1, I show that increases in government spending and consumption tax cuts
reduce the duration of liquidity traps and can prevent deflationary spirals. Furthermore, I
show that labor tax cuts, if anything, make liquidity traps worse. The mechanisms behind
the latter result are illustrated in Section 4.2, while the workings of spending increases and
consumption tax cuts are illustrated in Section 4.3. Finally Section 4.4 provides further
intuition by discussing fiscal multipliers.
4.1 Durations under fiscal stimulus
To make the effectives of fiscal stimulus in mitigating a certain liquidity trap comparable
across different shock sizes, the size of the stimulus package should vary with the size of the
shock. As a benchmark, I therefore assume the size of the initial increase in government
spending to be equal to the size of the initial shock hitting the economy. The sizes of
the labor tax and consumption tax cuts will always be scaled compared to the spending
increase size by respectively 1
w¯
and 1¯1−g¯ . This is to ensure that all stimulus measures have
the same direct impact on the government’s budget deficit, and hence are comparable.
In order to see the effects of fiscal stimulus on the durations of fundamentals-driven,
mixed and expectations driven liquidity traps for different planning horizons, I reproduce
Figures 1 and 2 under different stimulus packages. This is done for government spending
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Figure 4: Durations of liquidity traps for different fractions of backward-looking agents (x-axis)
and different shock sizes sizes (y-axis) in case of government spending increases. Pan-
els (a) and (c) captures both fundamentals-driven and mixed liquidity traps for differ-
ent planning horizons, while Panels (b) and (d) capture expectations-driven liquidity
traps. Darker color shades indicate a longer duration of the liquidity trap. The fully
white areas in the top indicate deflationary spirals.
increases, consumption tax cuts and labor tax cuts in respectively Figures 4, 5 and 6. In
all three figures, the top panels, (a) and (b), correspond to the infinite planning horizon
case of Figure 1, while bottom panels (c) and (d) correspond to the case with T = 4 of
Figure 2.
Starting with the fundamentals-driven liquidity trap in the most left part of panel (a),
it can be seen in Figure 4 that, with government spending increases, longer lasting liquidity
traps no longer arise. Instead, the liquidity trap always lasts for only one period, which
indicates that the trap is resolved immediately in the period that the stimulus package is
implemented (which is one period after the start of the liquidity trap). Looking at panel
(a) of Figure 5, the same holds when fiscal stimulus takes the form of consumption tax
cuts. Moreover, this result also holds for finite planing horizons, as can be seen in the
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most left part of panel (c) of the two figures. Under labor tax cuts, on the other hand,
the durations of fundamentals driven liquidity traps become longer rather than shorter for
both infinite and finite planning horizons (most left parts of panels (a) and (c) of Figure
6).
For mixed liquidity traps (the interior of panels (a) and (c) of the three figures) similar
results are obtained: spending increases and consumption tax-cuts lead to shorter liquidity
traps, while labor tax cuts do not. Note however, that spending increases seem to be
somewhat more effective than consumption tax cuts. This is discussed in more detail in
Section 4.3.
The next thing to note is that, for infinite planing horizons, deflationary spirals can
still arise for very large shocks and relatively large fractions of backward-looking agents.
These could however be eliminated with larger government spending increases or larger
consumption tax cuts.4
Finally, note that, for finite planing horizons, government spending increases and con-
sumption tax cuts seem to be especially effective for relatively large but not extremely
large fractions of backward looking agents, e.g. around 3
4
. Here, deflationary spirals arose
even for relatively small shock values in panel (a) of Figure 2. In panel (c) of Figures 4 and
5, on the other hand, deflationary spirals do not arise. Moreover, liquidity traps do not
even seem to last particularly long for this range of fractions of backward-looking agents.
The intuition for this result will be discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
Now, turn to the expectations-driven liquidity traps in panels (b) and (d) of Figures
4 and 5. Also here, spending increases and consumption tax cuts reduce the durations of
liquidity traps compared to panel (b) of Figures 1 and 2. For finite planning horizons, the
stimulus is, furthermore, again especially effective for a range of fractions of backward-
looking agents around 3
4
, and for infinite planning horizons, deflationary spirals still arise.
4Results on the required stimulus size to fully eliminate liquidity traps are available on request.
23
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
(a) Persistent fun. shock, T =∞
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
(b) Non-persistent exp. shock, T =∞
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
(c) Persistent fun. shock, T = 4
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
(d) Non-persistent exp. shock, T = 4
Figure 5: Durations of liquidity traps for different fractions of backward-looking agents (x-axis)
and different shock sizes sizes (y-axis) in case of consumption tax cuts. Panels (a) and
(c) captures both fundamentals-driven and mixed liquidity traps for different planning
horizons, while Panels (b) and (d) capture expectations-driven liquidity traps. Darker
color shades indicate a longer duration of the liquidity trap. The fully white areas in
the top indicate deflationary spirals.
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Figure 6: Durations of liquidity traps for different fractions of backward-looking agents (x-axis)
and different shock sizes sizes (y-axis) in case of labor tax cuts. Panels (a) and (c)
captures both fundamentals-driven and mixed liquidity traps for different planning
horizons, while Panels (b) and (d) capture expectations-driven liquidity traps. Darker
color shades indicate a longer duration of the liquidity trap. The fully white areas in
the top indicate deflationary spirals.
These deflationary spirals could again be eliminated by larger stimulus packages, but
the following is noteworthy. Under infinite planning horizons, fiscal stimulus can either
almost completely eliminate a liquidity trap or the stimulus is not sufficient to prevent a
deflationary spiral. Intermediate cases, where fiscal stimulus is able to prevent a deflation-
ary spiral but results in a liquidity trap with a relatively long duration do not arise. That
is, where finite planning horizons can lead to longer lasting liquidity traps from which the
economy eventually recovers, this does not happen under infinite planning horizons, even
when there is fiscal stimulus.
Finally, turning to panels (b) and (d) of Figures 6, it can be concluded that, also
in expectations-driven liquidity traps, labor tax cuts are not an effective tool. The next
section provides more insight in why that is the case.
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4.2 The ineffectiveness of labor tax cuts
Above, it was found that labor tax cuts are not an effective tool for shortening any
type of liquidity trap and cannot prevent deflationary spirals. This is a known result
for fundamentals-driven liquidity traps under the infinite horizon rational expectations
benchmark, since labor tax cuts are deflationary here.
Below, I show that this is also the case under heterogeneous expectations with finite
planning horizons and identify an extra channel that makes anticipated labor tax cuts even
less effective in mixed and expectations-driven liquidity traps.
Figure 7 depicts dynamics in a mixed liquidity trap with 25% backward-looking agents
and a stimulus package in the form of labor tax cuts, which starts one period after the
initial fundamental shock. As in Figure 3, solid curves depict medians, and dotted curves
0.05 and 0.95 quantiles.
First considering the blue curves without stimulus, it can be observed that output falls
persistently due to the persistent negative preference shock. The fall in aggregate demand
leads to a fall in labor demand, causing a drop in wages (bottom-right panel). This implies
lower marginal costs for firms and a persistent drop in inflation. Moreover, all variables
fall even more due to backward-looking agents that become pessimistic after observing
low output and inflation, and due to forward-looking agents anticipating this. The latter
mechanism is similar to the one in the expectations-driven liquidity trap described in
Section 3.4.
The red curves in Figure 7 depict the case where labor taxes are cut in period 2. This
leads to an increase in labor supply (due to the substitution effect). As a consequence,
wages fall more to equate labor supply and labor demand. Lower wages, in turn, lead to
lower marginal costs for firms and lower inflation.
Since the interest rate is stuck at the zero lower bound, lower inflation implies higher
real interest rates. Lower expected future inflation hence puts downward pressure on the
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Figure 7: Mixed liquidity trap for T = 4, ξˆ1 = −0.08 and 25% backward-looking agents. Red
curves depict the case of fiscal stimulus in the form of labor tax cuts, while blue curves
correpsond to the case of no stimulus. Solid curves are median impulse responses and
dotted curves depict 0.05 and 0.95 quantiles.
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consumption of forward-looking households. Consumption of backward-looking households
will be negatively effected slightly later, when they have observed the drop in inflation.
Hence, labor tax cuts are not only deflationary, but also are not able to significantly increase
output. In the end, the liquidity trap is made worse rather than better by the stimulus
package and its duration is increased.
It follows from the above that the effects of labor tax cuts on inflation and output
depend on the extend to which labor supply and hence wages are affected. The precise
dynamics that arise after a labor tax cut hence depend on the calibration of the parameters
in the utility function, η and σ. For example, if the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, η,
were lower, labor supply would react less to a change in labor taxes, resulting in a smaller
drop in wages and inflation. However, the result that labor tax cuts are deflationary and
make liquidity traps last long rather than shorter holds for all reasonable calibrations of σ
and η.
This main mechanism renders labor taxes ineffective for any fraction of backward-
looking agents and any horizon. It holds under mixed and expectations-driven liquidity
traps as well as fundamentals-driven liquidity traps. In Figure 7 there is however an
additional channel that makes anticipated labor tax cuts less effective in a mixed liquidity
trap. This channel is not present in the homogeneous expectations benchmark.
When forward-looking agents anticipate lower future prices and consumption and higher
future real interest rates, they cut prices and consumption already in the period before the
start of the consolidation package. In a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap there is not
much endogenous persistence, implying that the effect of this initial anticipation on in-
flation and output in later periods is small. In contrast, in a mixed liquidity trap (or
expectations-driven liquidity trap) output and inflation in the period where the stimulus
package is actually implemented become considerably lower due to these anticipation ef-
fects. This is because backward-looking agents observe the lower prices and output caused
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by the anticipation of forward-looking agents in the previous period and adjust their own
expectations accordingly. As a consequence, they reduce consumption and prices more.
In a mixed or expectations-driven liquidity trap with both forward-looking and backward-
looking agents, anticipated consolidations hence are even less effective in the period of
implementation than in a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap with homogeneous rational
expectations.
4.3 Effective fiscal stimulus under heterogeneous-expectations
Next, I consider in detail the other two fiscal instruments: government spending increases
and consumption tax cuts. In Section 4.1, we saw that fiscal stimulus with one of these
measures can considerably reduce the length of a liquidity trap and even prevent a de-
flationary spiral. Below, I show why this is the case. I do so for a mixed liquidity trap
where half of the agents are forward-looking and half of the agents are backward-looking.
Intuitions for different fractions of backward-looking agents and for expectations-driven
liquidity traps are similar to those discussed below.
In Figure 8, the case of no fiscal stimulus is plotted in blue. Dynamics here are similar
to those in Figure 7, but the liquidity trap is somewhat worse due to the higher fraction
of backward-looking agents. Especially visible is the larger drop in inflation in period 2,
which arises due to backward-looking agents having lower inflation expectations because
of the observed drop in period 1 inflation. The liquidity trap also lasts longer then the
blue case in Figure 7. These worse conditions allow the effectiveness of spending increases
and consumption tax cuts to be illustrated even more convincingly.
The green curves in Figure 8 plot the case of an anticipated spending increase package
that starts one period after the start of the liquidity trap (i.e., in period 2). Higher
government spending leads to higher labor demand and higher wages. This leads to higher
marginal costs and inflation. This, in turn, leads to lower real interest rates since the
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nominal interest rate is stuck at the zero lower bound. Therefore, there is very little
crowding out and consumption does not fall by much compared to the blue curves (bottom-
left panel). Hence the higher government spending leads to a considerable increase in
output.
Finally, the black curves depict the case of consumption tax cuts that start in period 2.
Here, households consume more because of the lower taxes. Hence, labor demand goes up,
and so do wages. This leads to inflation and lower real interest rates, further increasing
current consumption and output.
The above mechanisms are also present in fundamentals-driven liquidity trap. In a
fundamentals-driven liquidity trap, a stimulus package that is large an persistent enough
can so off-set the negative fundamental shock and immediately eliminate the liquidity trap.
For a given shock size, however, mixed liquidity traps feature lower output and inflation
and a longer liquidity trap. So why is it that a fiscal stimulus package of the same size is
still so effective in ending the liquidity trap?
If increases in government spending or cuts in consumption taxes increase output and
inflation, then this counteracts the fundamental shock, as in the homogeneous case. But,
additionally, higher inflation and output will cause expectations of backward-looking agents
to be considerably higher one period later. That is, the stimulus, not only offsets the
fundamentals part of the mixed liquidity trap, but after one period also the expectations
part. Since forward-looking agents anticipate this ending of both the fundamentals and
expectations part of the liquidity trap, they will have much higher output and inflation
expectations already in the two periods before, which makes the fiscal stimulus even more
effective.
Similar arguments apply to expectations-driven liquidity traps with both backward-
looking and forward-looking agents, explaining why fiscal stimulus is an highly effective
tool in that case as well. This is discussed in more detail in the next section.
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As in the previous section, the exact effects of a fiscal stimulus depend on the utility
function of the household. Particularly interesting for the comparison of spending increases
versus consumption tax cuts is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution:
σ. When this parameter is calibrated at a lower value, households respond more with
their current period consumption to any change in expectations or in income. This means
that consumption falls more when government spending is increased and that consumption
increases more when consumption taxes are lowed. Hence, with a lower value of σ, gov-
ernment spending increases are relatively less effective in mitigating a liquidity trap, while
consumption tax cuts are relatively more effective. In particular, for a value of σ = 1,
consumption taxes are almost as effective as government spending increases in shortening
liquidity traps and preventing deflationary spirals.
4.4 Fiscal multipliers
To gain more insight in how heterogeneous expectations influence the effectiveness of fiscal
stimulus in a liquidity trap, I now turn to fiscal multipliers. Panel (a) and (b) of Table 1
presents multipliers for different fractions of backward-looking agents in case of a persistent
fundamental shock, while panel (c) considers expectations-driven liquidity traps. I present
both impact multipliers, and cumulative multipliers after 12 periods (last 3 columns of
both panels). The multipliers are calculated by considering a very small change in the fiscal
instrument (an increase of 0.0001). This way, the stimulus never changes the duration of
a liquidity trap, which would have made multipliers less comparable. Multipliers are then
calculated following Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Bi et al. (2013) as
Γt+k =
k∑
j=0
(
j∏
i=0
r−1t+i
)(
Y st+j − Y nst+j
)
/
k∑
j=0
(
j∏
i=0
r−1t+i
)(
xst+j − xnst+j
)
, (27)
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where rt is the gross interest rate, and xt denotes the type of fiscal stimulus. xt = Gt
in case of government spending increases, xt = τ ct C¯ in case of consumption tax cuts, and
xt = τ
l
t w¯H¯ in case of labor tax cuts.
5 Y st and x
s
t indicate values taken when there is fiscal
stimulus and Y nst and x
ns
t indicate values that would have occurred in the absence of fiscal
stimulus.
The first row of panel (b) corresponds to the case of a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap
when T = 4, with a shock size of 0.08. For comparison, the infinite horizon case is given
in the first row of panel (a) of Table 1. In both cases, impact multipliers of government
spending are close to 1, indicating that government spending increases can successfully
increase output. The consumption tax multipliers are somewhat smaller (in absolute value),
but also consumption tax cuts will considerably increase output. The impact multipliers
for labor taxes, on the other hand, are approximately zero, confirming that labor tax
cuts cannot increase output in the short-run. Cumulative labor tax multipliers after 12
periods are negative, but still relatively small, indicating a very minor positive medium-run
effect of labor tax cuts. Medium-run cumulative multipliers of government spending and
consumption taxes are similar to the respective impact multipliers, but somewhat smaller.
Before turning to the mixed liquidity traps, lets first consider the multipliers in expectation-
driven liquidity traps in panel (c) of Table 1. For small fractions of backward-looking
agents, no expectations-driven liquidity traps of more than 1 period arise. For large frac-
tions of backward-looking agents and an infinite planning horizon, deflationary spirals arise
for all shock sizes so that no meaningful multipliers can be obtained there. Therefore, panel
5I multiply labor taxes by w¯H¯ and consumption taxes by C¯ to get a change in tax income due to a
changed tax rate, rather than the change in the tax rate itself. This facilitates compatibility with changes
in government spending. Using the definitions of (log)-linearized variables, I then calculate multipliers as
follows. Γt+k =
∑k
j=0
(∏j
i=0 r
−1
t+i
)(
Yˆ st+j − Yˆ nst+j
)
/
∑k
j=0
(∏j
i=0 r
−1
t+i
) (
g˜st+j − g˜nst+j
)
for government spend-
ing, Γt+k =
∑k
j=0
(∏j
i=0 r
−1
t+i
)(
Yˆ st+j − Yˆ nst+j
)
/
∑k
j=0
(∏j
i=0 r
−1
t+i
) (
(1− g¯)(τ˜ c,st+j − τ˜ c,nst+j )
)
for consumption
taxes, and Γt+k =
∑k
j=0
(∏j
i=0 r
−1
t+i
)(
Yˆ st+j − Yˆ nst+j
)
/
∑k
j=0
(∏j
i=0 r
−1
t+i
)(
w¯(τ˜ l,st+j − τ˜ l,nst+j )
)
for labor taxes.
In computing the multipliers, I use the realized real interest rates under fiscal stimulus along the transition
path.
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Panel (a): T =∞ and persistent negative fundamental shock (of size 0.08)
Impact multiplier Medium-run multiplier (12 per.)
Frac. BL Gov. spen. Cons. tax Labor tax Gov. spen. Cons. tax Labor tax
0 0.92 -0.56 0.02 0.74 -0.46 -0.14
0.25 1.50 -0.92 0.51 1.12 -0.62 0.19
Panel (b): T = 4 and persistent negative fundamental shock (of size 0.08)
Impact multiplier Medium-run multiplier (12 per.)
Frac. BL Gov. spen. Cons. tax Labor tax Gov. spen. Cons. tax Labor tax
0 0.98 -0.61 0.01 0.79 -0.49 -0.13
0.25 1.31 -0.82 0.23 1.01 -0.63 0.01
0.5 2.10 -1.32 0.71 1.76 -1.11 0.47
0.75 2.43 -1.53 0.88 2.95 -1.87 1.17
0.875 1.34 -0.83 0.20 1.74 -1.10 0.40
1 1.00 -0.62 -0.01 1.28 -0.81 0.11
Panel (c): T = 4 and non-persistent negative shock to expectations (of size 0.11)
Impact multiplier Medium-run multiplier (12 per.)
Frac. BL Gov. spen. Cons. tax Labor tax Gov. spen. Cons. tax Labor tax
0.6 1.14 -0.71 0.11 0.92 -0.57 -0.07
0.7 1.34 -0.83 0.22 1.19 -0.75 0.09
0.8 1.43 -0.89 0.27 1.54 -0.97 0.30
0.9 1.28 -0.80 0.16 1.98 -1.25 0.54
1 1.00 -0.62 -0.01 1.56 -0.98 0.27
Table 1: Impact multipliers and 12-period cumulative multipliers for different fiscal instruments
and different types of liquidity traps.
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(c) depicts multipliers only for T = 4 and only for larger fractions of backward-looking
agents. The shock size is set to 0.11.
Looking at the impact spending and consumption tax multipliers in panel (c), it can be
seen that these are larger than those in the fundamentals-driven liquidity trap. Moreover,
multipliers initially become larger as the fraction of backward-looking agents increases,
but then become smaller again when the fraction of backward-looking agents becomes
very large. The same holds for the cumulative multipliers in the right part of the panel,
but here the largest multipliers are reached at fractions of around 0.9 rather than 0.8.
The intuition for these results comes from the interaction of the expectations of the
two types of agents. Since increases in government spending and consumption tax cuts
increase inflation and output, these measures raise expectations of backward-looking agents
one period later and thus counteract the driving force of the liquidity trap. The larger the
fraction of backward-looking agents, the more output will be raised by this in later periods
and the larger the medium-run cumulative multiplier. Forward-looking agents anticipate
this and turn more optimistic about the future already at the start of the liquidity trap.
They, therefore, will have higher prices and consumption already at the period where
the stimulus package is first implemented, which increases the impact multiplier. This
leads to a feedback mechanism, where the higher output and inflation on impact cause
expectations of backward-looking agents to be higher one period later, which again implies
a larger cumulative multiplier and through the expectations of forward-looking agents an
even larger impact multiplier.
The size of the impact multiplier hence depends on the size of the medium-run cumu-
lative multiplier, but also on the fraction of forward-looking agents. When the fraction of
backward-looking agents is 0.9, there are too little forward-looking agents in the economy
to let the high cumulative multiplier be translated in to a very high impact multiplier.
Finally, when the there are only backward-looking agents, the above feedback mechanism
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completely disappears. The impact multipliers of government spending and consumption
taxes are now comparable in size to the case of a fundamentals-driven liquidity trap, and
the cumulative multipliers are also somewhat lower again.
Now, turn to the mixed liquidity trap cases in rows 2 - 5 of panel (b). As in panel
(c), the impact multipliers for government spending and consumption taxes first become
considerably larger and then smaller again as the fraction of backward-looking agent grows.
However, the cumulative multiplier now co-moves more with the impact multiplier and
also has its peek around 0.75. Moreover, both impact and cumulative multipliers are
considerably larger here than under expectations-driven liquidity traps.
The intuition for these findings is the feedback mechanism described in 4.3. That is,
the interaction of forward-looking agents, who expect both the fundamentals part and
the expectations part of the liquidity trap to be reduced by the stimulus, with backward-
looking agents, who respond positively in later periods to price and consumption increases
of forward-looking agents. This can lead to very large positive effects of fiscal stimulus.
The reason that the largest cumulative and impact multiplier are reached at a smaller
fraction of backward-looking agents than in the expectations-driven liquidity trap is that in
a mixed liquidity trap output and inflation become considerably lower when there also is a
large fraction of forward-looking agents (we saw this in the blue curves in Figure 8). Hence,
there is more potential for the feedback mechanism to raise output and inflation. This is
not so much the case in the expectations driven liquidity trap where the fundamentals part
of the trap is absent.
In the second row of panel (a) it can be seen that mixed liquidity lead to larger govern-
ment spending and consumption tax multipliers than fundamentals-driven liquidity traps
also for the case of infinite planning horizons. Meaningful multipliers for larger fractions
of backward-looking agents cannot be obtained here since deflationary spirals then arise
without stimulus.
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Finally, turn to the labor tax multipliers in expectations-driven and mixed liquidity
traps. These are (almost) always positive, indicating that labor tax cuts cannot increase
output on impact or in the medium run. Moreover, the size of the multiplier as the fraction
of backward-looking agents is varied follows a similar pattern as that of the government
spending multiplier. This is because the feedback mechanism that negatively effects antic-
ipated labor tax cuts (discussed in Section 4.2) is also largest when there is both a large
fraction of backward-looking agents and a significant fraction of forward-looking agents.
5 Discussion of implicit long run expectations in value
functions
In this paper, I have mainly focused on liquidity traps in case of finite planning horizons.
Agents with finite planning horizons only have the cognitive ability to make a detailed
consumption and pricing plan based on expectations for T periods into the future. However,
they also care about what will happen after that by using a value function to asses the
value of having certain amount of wealth or a certain relative price in terms of utility in
the periods outside their planning horizon. This value function can be motivated as being
based on experience over a long time span, and is generally not supposed to change due to
short run fluctuations in the economy.
However, one could argue that liquidity traps are exceptional times and that, in a severe
liquidity trap, pessimism not only affects expectations about short run fluctuations, but
also causes the valuation of states in the long run to suddenly change. This could, e.g.,
happen if agents no longer believe that the economy will eventually return to its normal
state, but that instead variables as output and inflation will be permanently lower. This
kind of long-run pessimism would have additional negative effects on output and inflation,
leading to worse liquidity traps.
37
To see this, first consider the firm problem. If the value function of firms would be
allowed to adjust in a time of long-run pessimism, this would be reflected in values for λ,
Y , mc and Π in (2.2) that deviate from their steady state values. In particular, we could
make these long run believes (denoted with superscript LR) time varying variables and
write
V˜ (r) =
1
1− ωβ(ΠLR)θ−1λ
LR
t
(
r
ΠLRt
)1−θ
Y LRt −
1
1− ωβ(ΠLRt )θ
λLRt
(
r
ΠLRt
)−θ
Y LRt mc
LR
t .
(28)
In Appendix D it is shown that, in this case, extra terms arise in the Phillips curve,
affecting inflation as follows. Long-run believes about inflation affect current inflation
with coefficient 1−ωΠ¯
θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
(
θ(c1)T+1
1−c1 −
(θ−1)(c2)T+1
1−c2
)
> 0. Further, Yˆ LRt and λˆ
LR
t both have a
coefficient 1−ωΠ¯
θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
(
(c1)
T+1 − (c2)T+1
)
> 0, and mˆcLRt has a coefficient
1−ωΠ¯θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1 (c1)
T+1 > 0.
Here, c1 = ωβΠ¯θ and c2 = ωβΠ¯θ−1.
In the households’ value function, long-run pessimism would reflect in believes about
long run income, Λ, and long run inflation. In Appendix D it is shown that when these two
parameters in the value function are made time varying, two additional terms in the output
equations show up. In particular, long-run believes about income affect current output with
coefficient β
T+1
1−β
ubΛ¯
C¯(1+τ¯c)ρ
> 0 and long-run believes about inflation affect current output with
coefficient −βT+1
ρ
(b¯− ub
(1−β)σ ). Composite parameters are defined in Appendix B.
From the above it is clear that pessimism about the long-run state of the economy,
through the value function, can depress output and inflation, making liquidity traps worse.
This could then also create extra scope for effective fiscal stimulus, since long run pessimism
may (partly) disappear if agents expect or experience a fiscal stimulus package. A full
analysis of this issue is, however, beyond the scope of the paper.
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6 Conclusion
I present a New Keynesian model with two forms of bounded rationality. First of all, while
one fraction of agents is forward-looking and has rational expectations, another fraction
of agents forms expectations in a backward-looking manner, based on the most recently
observed state of the economy. They expect a similar economic situation to continue in
the short run, but expect mean reversion to the target steady state in the medium to long
run. Secondly, all agents in the economy have a finite planning horizon and are not able to
base their consumption and pricing decisions upon considerations and expectations about
the infinite future.
The presence of backward-looking agents in the economy can result in liquidity traps
of multiple periods that are fully (expectations-driven liquidity trap) or partly (mixed
liquidity trap) driven by expectations. The former type arises after a single negative shock
to inflation and output expectations of backward-looking agents, while the latter arises
because of a persistent fundamental shock. The duration of these liquidity trap crucially
depends on agents’ planning horizons. For infinite horizons, the liquidity trap either lasts
at most three or four periods, or the economy ends up in a deflationary spiral. When
planning horizons are short, on the other hand, deflationary spirals become less likely, and
instead long lasting liquidity traps from which the economy eventually recovers can arise.
I show that fiscal stimulus in the form of spending increases or cuts in consumption
taxes is very effective in reducing the duration of liquidity traps and preventing deflation-
ary spirals. Labor tax cuts on the other hand, are deflationary and are not an effective tool
in any of the liquidity traps studied in this paper. Spending increases and consumption
tax cuts increase labor demand and wages, resulting in inflationary pressures. Fiscal mul-
tipliers of these instruments are largest when the majority of agents is backward-looking
but there also is a significant fraction of forward-looking agents in the economy. In that
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case, a feedback mechanism arises, where forward-looking expect the stimulus to lead to
higher future output and inflation and increase current consumption and prices. This is
later observed by backward-looking agents, causing them to also increase consumption and
prices, which is again anticipated by forward-looking agents. This feedback is strongest in
mixed liquidity traps, but also leads to large multipliers in expectations-driven liquidity
traps.
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A Steady state
In this section, the steady state of the non-linear model is derived, where the preference
shock is assumed to be constant at ξ = 1.
From the consumer Euler equation it follows that in this steady state we must have
1 + i¯
Π¯
=
1
β
(29)
Furthermore, from (58) it follows that
H¯ = s¯Y¯ (30)
Next, we can solve the steady state aggregate resource constraint, (21), for consumption,
and write
C¯ = Y¯ (1− g¯) (31)
Plugging in these steady state labor and consumption levels in the steady state version of
the optimal labor/consumption trade off gives
m¯c = w¯ =
s¯ηY¯ η+σ(1− g¯)σ(1 + τ¯ c)
1− τ¯ l (32)
So that steady state output can be written as
Y¯ =
(
m¯c(1− τ¯ l)
s¯η(1− g¯)σ(1 + τ¯ c)
) 1
η+σ
(33)
For the relative optimal price, we write (53) as
d¯ =
(
1− ωΠθ−1
1− ω
) 1
1−θ
(34)
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For price dispersion, we then write
s¯ =
(1− ω)
1− ωΠ¯θ d¯
−θ =
(1− ω)
1− ωΠ¯θ
(
1− ωΠθ−1
1− ω
) θ
θ−1
(35)
Evaluating (47) at the steady state gives
m¯c = d¯
θ − 1
θ
∑T
s=0 ω
sβsΠ¯s(θ−1) + (ωβΠ¯
θ−1)T+1
1−ωβΠ¯θ−1∑T
s=0 ω
sβsΠ¯s(θ) + (ωβΠ¯
θ)T+1
1−ωβΠ¯θ
=
(
1− ωΠθ−1
1− ω
) 1
1−θ θ − 1
θ
(1− ωβΠθ)
(1− ωβΠθ−1)
(36)
Firm profits we can write as
Ξ¯ = (1− w¯s¯)Y¯ (37)
Then we turn to the government budget constraint. In steady state (20) reduces to
βb¯
Π¯
= (1 + τ¯ c)g¯ − τ¯ lw¯s¯− τ¯ c − L¯S
Y¯
+
b¯
Π¯
, (38)
which gives
b¯ = Π¯
(τ¯ lw¯s¯+ τ¯ c + L¯S
Y¯
− (1 + τ¯ c)g¯)
1− β , (39)
B Log-linearized model
In this Section, I log-linearize the model equations around the steady state.
B.1 Households
The log linearized optimality conditions of the households (including budget constraints)
are given by
Cˆiτ = Cˆ
i
τ+1 −
1
σ
(iτ − pˆiτ+1 + ξτ+1 − ξτ − τ˜
c
τ+1 − τ˜ cτ
1 + τ¯ c
), τ = t, t+ 1, ...t+ T − 1 (40)
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b˜it+T+1 =
ub
1− β Cˆ
i
t+T +
ub
(1− β)σ
τ˜ ct+T
1 + τ¯ c
+
ub
(1− β)σE
i
tit+T −
ub
(1− β)σξt+T , (41)
ηHˆ iτ = −σCˆiτ −
τ˜ cτ
1 + τ¯ c
− τ˜
l
τ
1− τ¯ l + wˆτ , τ = t, t+ 1, ...t+ T (42)
b˜iτ+1 =
w¯s¯Π¯
β
((1− τ¯ l)(Eitwˆτ + Hˆ iτ )− Eit τ˜ lτ ) +
1
β
b˜iτ + b¯(ˆiτ −
1
β
Eit pˆiτ ) +
Ξ¯Π¯
Y¯ β
EitΞˆτ
− L¯SΠ¯
Y¯ β
EitLˆSτ −
(1− g¯)Π¯
β
(
(1 + τ¯ c)Cˆiτ + τ˜
c
τ
)
, τ = t, t+ 1, ...t+ T (43)
with
ub = (1− g¯)(1 + τ¯ c)Π¯ (44)
where it is used that H¯ = s¯Y¯ , C¯
Y¯
= 1− g¯ and Λ
1+τ¯c
+ 1−β
1+τ¯c
Y¯ b¯
Π
= C¯
Iterating the budget constraint T periods, and using the first order conditions of the
household, the following equation can be derived, that describes a households optimal
consumption decision in period t.
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(
βT+1
1− βub +
(
σ
η
w¯s¯(1− τ¯ l) + (1 + τ¯ c)(1− g¯)
)
Π¯
1− βT+1
1− β
)
Cˆit =
b˜it + w¯s¯Π¯(1− τ¯ l)
T∑
s=0
βs
(
(1 +
1
η
)(Eitwˆt+s −
Eit τ˜
l
t+s
1− τ¯ l )−
1
η
Eit τ˜
c
t+s
1 + τ¯ c
)
+
Ξ¯Π¯
Y¯
T∑
s=0
βs(EitΞˆt+s)
− L¯SΠ¯
Y¯
T∑
s=0
βs(EitLˆSt+s)−
(
σ
η
w¯s¯(1− τ¯ l) + (1 + τ¯ c)(1− g¯)
)
Π¯
T∑
s=1
βs
s−1∑
j=0
1
σ
(Eitit+j − Eit pˆit+j+1)
−
(
σ
η
w¯s¯(1− τ¯ l) + (1 + τ¯ c)(1− g¯)
)
Π¯
T∑
s=1
βs
(
1
σ
(Eitξt+s − Eitξt −
Eit τ˜
c
t+s − Eit τ˜ ct
1 + τ¯ c
)
)
− (1− g¯)Π¯
T∑
s=0
βs
(
Eit τ˜
c
t+s
)
+ b¯
T∑
s=0
βs(βEit iˆt+s − Eit pˆit+s) (45)
− β
T+1
1− β
ub
σ
T−1∑
j=0
(Eitit+j − Eit pˆit+j+1)−
βT+1
1− β
ub
σ
Eitit+T +
βT+1
1− β
ub
σ
ξt − β
T+1
1− β
ub
σ
τ˜ ct
1 + τ¯ c
Aggregating this equation over all households yields an expression for aggregate con-
sumption as a function of aggregate expectations about aggregate variables, only.
(
βT+1
1− βub +
(
σ
η
w¯s¯(1− τ¯ l) + (1 + τ¯ c)(1− g¯)
)
Π¯
1− βT+1
1− β
)
Cˆt =
b˜t + w¯s¯Π¯(1− τ¯ l)
T∑
s=0
βs
(
(1 +
1
η
)(E¯twˆt+s − E¯tτ˜
l
t+s
1− τ¯ l )−
1
η
E¯tτ˜
c
t+s
1 + τ¯ c
)
+
Ξ¯Π¯
Y¯
T∑
s=0
βs(E¯tΞˆt+s)
− L¯SΠ¯
Y¯
T∑
s=0
βs(E¯tLˆSt+s)−
(
σ
η
w¯s¯(1− τ¯ l) + (1 + τ¯ c)(1− g¯)
)
Π¯
T∑
s=1
βs
s−1∑
j=0
1
σ
(E¯tit+j − E¯tpˆit+j+1)
−
(
σ
η
w¯s¯(1− τ¯ l) + (1 + τ¯ c)(1− g¯)
)
Π¯
T∑
s=1
βs
(
1
σ
(E¯tξt+s − E¯tξt − E¯tτ˜
c
t+s − E¯tτ˜ ct
1 + τ¯ c
)
)
− (1− g¯)Π¯
T∑
s=0
βs
(
E¯tτ˜
c
t+s
)
+ b¯
T∑
s=0
βs(βE¯tiˆt+s − E¯tpˆit+s) (46)
− β
T+1
1− β
ub
σ
T−1∑
j=0
(E¯tit+j − E¯tpˆit+j+1)− β
T+1
1− β
ub
σ
E¯tit+T +
βT+1
1− β
ub
σ
ξt − β
T+1
1− β
ub
σ
τ˜ ct
1 + τ¯ c
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B.2 Firms
Equation (17) can be written as
p∗t (j)
Pt
[
E˜jt
T∑
s=0
ωsβs
ξt+s
1 + τ ct+s
(
Cjt+s
)−σ (Pt+s
Pt
)θ−1
Yt+s +
(ωβ)T+1
1− ωβΠ¯θ−1 Y¯ λ¯
(
Π¯Pt+T
Pt
)θ−1]
(47)
=
θ
θ − 1
[
E˜jt
T∑
s=0
ωsβs
ξt+s
1 + τ ct+s
(
Cjt+s
)−σ (Pt+s
Pt
)θ
Yt+smct+s +
(ωβ)T+1
1− ωβΠ¯θ Y¯ λ¯m¯c
(
Π¯Pt+T
Pt
)θ]
Eliminating prices, we can instead write the equation in terms of dt(j) =
p∗t (j)
Pt
and in
terms of inflation as
dt(j)
E˜jt T∑
s=0
ωsβs
ξt+s
1 + τ ct+s
(
Cjt+s
)−σ( s∏
j=1
Πt+j
)θ−1
Yt+s +
(ωβ)T+1Π¯θ−1
1− ωβΠ¯θ−1 Y¯ λ¯
(
T∏
j=1
Πt+j
)θ−1
=
θ
θ − 1
E˜jt T∑
s=0
ωsβs
ξt+s
1 + τ ct+s
(
Cjt+s
)−σ( s∏
j=1
Πt+j
)θ
Yt+smct+s +
(ωβ)T+1Π¯θ
1− ωβΠ¯θ Y¯ λ¯m¯c
(
T∏
j=1
Πt+j
)θ ,
(48)
Log linearizing (48) gives
dˆt(j) =E˜
j
t
T∑
s=0
((1− c1)(c1)s − (1− c2)(c2)s)
(
Yˆt+s − σCˆt+s − τ˜
c
t+s
1 + τ¯ c
+ ξˆt+s
)
(49)
+ E˜jt
T∑
s=0
(1− c1)(c1)smˆct+s + E˜jt
T∑
s=1
(θ(c1)
s − (θ − 1)(c2)s) pˆit+s
with
c1 = ωβΠ¯
θ (50)
c2 = ωβΠ¯
θ−1 (51)
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Aggregating (49) yields
∫ 1
0
dˆt(j)dj =E¯t
T∑
s=0
((1− c1)(c1)s − (1− c2)(c2)s)
(
Yˆt+s − σCˆt+s − τ˜
c
t+s
1 + τ¯ c
+ ξˆt+s
)
(52)
+ E¯t
T∑
s=0
(1− c1)(c1)smˆct+s + E¯t
T∑
s=1
(θ(c1)
s − (θ − 1)(c2)s) pˆit+s
Next, dividing by Pt, (18) can be written as
1 = ωΠθ−1t + (1− ω)
∫ 1
0
dt(j)
1−θdj, (53)
Log linearizing, this implies
pˆit =
1− ωΠ¯θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
∫ 1
0
dˆt(j)dj. (54)
Plugging in in (52) gives
pˆit =
1− ωΠ¯θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
[
E¯t
T∑
s=0
((1− c1)(c1)s − (1− c2)(c2)s)
(
Yˆt+s − σCˆt+s − τ˜
c
t+s
1 + τ¯ c
+ ξˆt+s
)
+ E¯t
T∑
s=0
(1− c1)(c1)smˆct+s + E¯t
T∑
s=1
(θ(c1)
s − (θ − 1)(c2)s) pˆit+s
]
(55)
B.3 Final equations
To complete the model, I first log-linearize the government budget constraint, (20), to
b˜t+1 =
Π¯
β
g˜t− w¯s¯Π¯
β
(τ¯ l(wˆt+Hˆt)+τ˜
l
t )−
Π¯
β
(1−g¯)(τ¯ cCˆt+τ˜ ct )−
Π¯L¯S
βY¯
LˆSt+
1
β
b˜t+b¯(ˆit− 1
β
pˆit), (56)
Next, we can log linearize the market clearing condition, (21)
Yˆt = (1− g¯)Cˆt + g˜t, (57)
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Next, I turn to aggregate labor
Ht =
∫ 1
0
Ht(j)dj =
∫ 1
0
Yt(j)dj =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
djYt = stYt, (58)
where st =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
dj is price dispersion in the economy in period t. Linearizing this
equation and aggregating (42) wages and marginal costs can be written as
mˆct = wˆt = ηHˆt + σCˆt +
τ˜ ct
1 + τ¯ c
+
τ˜ lt
1− τ¯ l (59)
= (η +
σ
1− g¯ )Yˆt − σ
g˜t
1− g¯ +
τ˜ ct
1 + τ¯ c
+
τ˜ lt
1− τ¯ l + ηsˆt
Because all prices in the economy where set at different dates by the Calvo mechanism,
price dispersion can be written as
st = (1− ω)
∫ 1
0
(
p∗t (j)
Pt
)−θ
dj + ω(1− ω)
∫ 1
0
(
p∗t−1(j)
Pt
)−θ
dj + ω2(1− ω)
∫ 1
0
(
p∗t−2(j)
Pt
)−θ
dj + ...
= (1− ω)
∞∑
i=0
ωi
∫ 1
0
(
p∗t−i(j)
Pt
)−θ
dj (60)
We can therefore write price dispersion as
st = (1− ω)
∫ 1
0
(
p∗t (j)
Pt
)−θ
dj + ωΠθt (1− ω)
∞∑
i=0
ωi
∫ 1
0
(
p∗t−1−i(j)
Pt−1
)−θ
dj
= (1− ω)
∫ 1
0
dt(j)
−θdj + ωΠθtst−1 (61)
Price dispersion is log linearized to
sˆt = −θ(1− ωΠ¯θ)
∫ 1
0
dˆt(j)dj + θωΠ¯
θpˆit + ωΠ¯
θsˆt−1 (62)
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Using (54), this can be written as
sˆt =
θωΠ¯θ−1
1− ωΠ¯θ−1 (Π¯− 1)pˆit + ωΠ¯
θsˆt−1 (63)
Finally, we can write real aggregate firm profits as
Ξt =
∫ 1
0
Ξt(j)dj =
∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
Pt(j)
Pt
−mctYt(j)dj = (1−mctst)Yt, (64)
which can be log-linearized to
Ξˆt = Yˆt − s¯w¯
1− s¯w¯ (mˆct + sˆt) . (65)
Using (21) in (46) results in an expression for aggregate output.
Yˆt =
1
ρ
b˜t + gt + δ
T∑
s=0
βs((1− τ¯ l)E¯twˆt+s − E¯tτ˜ lt+s) +
(1− w¯s¯)Π¯
ρ
T∑
s=0
βs(E¯tΞˆt+s) (66)
− L¯SΠ¯
Y¯ ρ
T∑
s=0
βs(E¯tLˆSt+s)− µ
T∑
s=1
βs
s−1∑
j=0
(E¯tit+j − E¯tpˆit+j+1) + b¯
ρ
T∑
s=0
βs(βE¯tiˆt+s − E¯tpˆit+s)
− β
T+1
1− β
ub
σρ
T−1∑
j=0
(E¯tit+j − E¯tpˆit+j+1)− β
T+1
1− β
ub
σρ
E¯tit+T
µξξt − µ
T∑
s=1
βsE¯tξt+s − µcτ˜ ct −
Π¯(1− g¯)
ρ
(
1− 1
σ
) T∑
s=1
βsE¯tτ˜
c
t+s
δ =
w¯s¯Π¯
ρ
η + 1
η
(67)
µ =
Π¯
ρ
(
w¯s¯
η
(1− τ¯ l) + (1 + τ¯ c)1− g¯
σ
)
(68)
µξ =
Π¯
ρ
(
β − βT+1
1− β
w¯s¯
η
(1− τ¯ l) + (1 + τ¯ c) (1− g¯)β
σ(1− β)
)
(69)
52
µc =
Π¯
ρ
(
β − βT+1
1− β
w¯s¯
η
1− τ¯ l
1 + τ¯ c
+
(1− g¯)β
σ(1− β) + (1− g¯)
)
(70)
ρ =
1
1− g¯
[
βT+1
1− βub +
(
σ
η
w¯s¯(1− τ¯ l) + (1 + τ¯ c)(1− g¯)
)
Π¯
1− βT+1
1− β
]
(71)
I now assume that agents know, or have learned about the above relations between
aggregate variables (which hold in every period). Therefore, expectations about wages
and profits can be substituted for, using (59) and (65). This gives the following system
of 3 equations that, together with a specification of monetary and fiscal policy and price
dispersion, completely describe our model
(1− νy)Yˆt = 1
ρ
b˜t + gt + ντ
T∑
s=0
βs(E¯tτˆ
l
t+s) + νg
T∑
s=0
βs(E¯tgˆt+s) + νy
T∑
s=1
βs(E¯tYˆt+s)
+ νs
T∑
j=0
βj(E¯tsˆt+j)− µ
T∑
s=1
βs
s∑
j=1
(E¯tit+j−1 − E¯tpˆit+j) + b¯
ρ
T∑
s=0
βs(βE¯tiˆt+s − E¯tpˆit+s) (72)
− β
T+1
1− β
ub
σρ
T−1∑
j=0
(E¯tit+j − E¯tpˆit+j+1)− β
T+1
1− β
ub
σρ
E¯tit+T − L¯SΠ¯
Y¯ ρ
T∑
s=0
βs(E¯tLˆSt+s)
µξξt − µ
T∑
s=1
βsE¯tξt+s + νc1τ˜
c
t + νc2
T∑
s=1
βsE¯tτ˜
c
t+s
pˆit =E¯t
T∑
s=0
(κy1(c1)
s + κy2(c2)
s) Yˆt+s + κgE¯t
T∑
s=0
(c2)
sg˜t+s + κsE¯t
T∑
s=0
(c1)
ssˆt+s (73)
+ κcE¯t
T∑
s=0
(c2)
sτ˜ ct+s + κτ E¯t
T∑
s=0
(c1)
sτ˜ lt+s + E¯t
T∑
s=1
(κpi1(c1)
s + κpi2(c2)
s) pˆit+s
+ E¯t
T∑
s=0
(κξ1(c1)
s + κξ2(c2)
s) ξˆt+s
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b˜t+1 =
Π¯
β
g˜t − Π¯
β
τ¯ c(Yˆt − g˜t)− Π¯
β
(1− g¯)τ˜ ct +
1
β
b˜t + b¯(ˆit − 1
β
pˆit)− Π¯L¯S
βY¯
LˆSt (74)
− w¯s¯Π¯
β
[
τ¯ l
(
(1 + η +
σ
1− g¯ )Yˆt − σ
g˜t
1− g¯ +
τ˜ ct
1 + τ¯ c
+
τ˜ lt
1− τ¯ l + (1 + η)sˆt
)
+ τ˜ lt
]
,
with
νy =
(1− s¯w¯)Π¯
ρ
+
(
δ(1− τ¯ l)− s¯w¯Π¯
ρ
)
(η +
σ
1− g¯ ), (75)
νg =
(
s¯w¯Π¯
ρ
− δ(1− τ¯ l)
)
σ
1− g¯ , (76)
ντ = − s¯w¯Π¯
ρ(1− τ¯ l) , (77)
νs = − s¯w¯Π¯
ρ
(η + 1)τ¯ l, (78)
νc1 = δ
1− τ¯ l
1 + τ¯ c
− s¯w¯Π¯
ρ(1 + τ¯ c)
− µc, (79)
νc2 = δ
1− τ¯ l
1 + τ¯ c
− s¯w¯Π¯
ρ(1 + τ¯ c)
− Π¯(1− g¯)
ρ
(
1− 1
σ
)
, (80)
κy1 =
1− ωΠ¯θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
(1 + η)(1− ωβΠ¯θ) (81)
κy2 = −1− ωΠ¯
θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
(1− σ
1− g¯ )(1− ωβΠ¯
θ−1) (82)
κg = −1− ωΠ¯
θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
σ
(1− g¯)(1− ωβΠ¯
θ−1) (83)
κs =
1− ωΠ¯θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
η(1− ωβΠ¯θ) (84)
κc =
1− ωΠ¯θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
1
(1 + τ¯ c)
(1− ωβΠ¯θ−1) (85)
κτ =
1− ωΠ¯θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
1
(1− τ¯)(1− ωβΠ¯
θ) (86)
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κpi1 =
1− ωΠ¯θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
θ (87)
κpi2 = −1− ωΠ¯
θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
(θ − 1) (88)
κξ1 =
1− ωΠ¯θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
(1− ωβΠ¯θ) (89)
κξ2 = −1− ωΠ¯
θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
(1− ωβΠ¯θ−1) (90)
Linearized monetary and fiscal policy equations are given by
iˆt = φ1pˆit + φ2Yˆt, (91)
LˆSt = γLS b˜t. (92)
C Model under infinite planning horizons
C.1 Output
When we let the planning horizon, T, go to infinity (66) can be written as
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Yˆt =
1
ρ
b˜t + gt + δ
∞∑
s=0
βs((1− τ¯ l)((1− α)EFt wˆt+s + αEbt wˆt+s)− (1− α)EFt τ˜ lt+s − αEbt τ˜ lt+s)+
(1− w¯s¯)Π¯
ρ
∞∑
s=0
βs((1− α)EFt Ξˆt+s + αEbt Ξˆt+s)−
L¯SΠ¯
Y¯ ρ
T∑
s=0
βs((1− α)EFt LˆSt+s + αEbt LˆSt+s)
+
µβ
1− β ξt − µ
∞∑
s=1
βs((1− α)EFt ξˆt+s + αEbt ξˆt+s)
− µcτ˜ ct +
(
1
σ
− 1
)
1− g¯
ρ
Π¯
∞∑
s=1
βs((1− α)EFt τ˜ ct+s + αEbt τ˜ ct+s)
− µβ
1− β
∞∑
s=0
βs(((1− α)EFt iˆt+s + αEbt iˆt+s)− ((1− α)EFt pˆit+s+1 + αEbt pˆit+s+1))
+
b¯
ρ
∞∑
s=0
βs(β((1− α)EFt iˆt+s + αEbt iˆt+s)− ((1− α)EFt pˆit+s + αEbt pˆit+s))
Leading this equation 1 period and taking forward looking expectations gives
EFt Yˆt+1 = δ
∞∑
s=1
βs−1((1− τ¯ l)((1− α)EFt wˆt+s + αEFt Ebt+1wˆt+s)− (1− α)EFt τ˜ lt+s − αEFt Ebt+1τ˜ lt+s)
+
(1− w¯s¯)Π¯
ρ
∞∑
s=1
βs−1((1− α)EFt Ξˆt+s + αEFt Ebt+1Ξˆt+s)−
L¯SΠ¯
Y¯ ρ
T∑
s=0
βs((1− α)EFt LˆSt+s + αEFt Ebt+1LˆSt+s)
+ EFt gt+1 +
1
ρ
b˜t+1 +
µβ
1− βE
F
t ξˆt+1 − µ
∞∑
s=2
βs−1((1− α)EFt ξˆt+s + αEFt Ebt+1ξˆt+s)
− µcEFt τ˜ ct+1 +
(
1
σ
− 1
)
1− g¯
ρ
Π¯
∞∑
s=2
βs−1((1− α)EFt τ˜ ct+s + αEFt Ebt+1τ˜ ct+s)
− µβ
1− β
∞∑
s=1
βs−1(((1− α)EFt iˆt+s + αEFt Ebt+1iˆt+s)− ((1− α)EFt pˆit+s+1 + αEFt Ebt+1pˆit+s+1))
+
b¯
ρ
∞∑
s=1
βs−1(β((1− α)EFt iˆt+s + αEFt Ebt+1iˆt+s)− ((1− α)EFt pˆit+s + αEFt Ebt+1pˆit+s))
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We can therefore write
(1− z1νy)Yˆt = (β − αβνy)Eft Yˆt+1 + z2νyYˆt−1 +
1
ρ
(b˜t − βb˜t+1) + (1 + z1νg)g˜t − (β + αβνg)Eft g˜t+1
+ z2νgg˜t−1 + ντ (z1τ˜ lt + z2τ˜
l
t−1 − αβEft τ˜ lt+1) + νs(z1sˆt + z2sˆt−1 − αβEft sˆt+1)
+
µβ
1− β ξˆt −
(
β
µβ
1− β + µβ(1− α)
)
Eft ξˆt+1 −
L¯SΠ¯
Y¯ ρ
(z1LˆSt + z2LˆSt−1 − αβEft LˆSt+1)
+
(
νc1 − νc2α β
2d2
1− βd
)
τ˜ ct + νc2z2τ˜
c
t−1 + (−βνc1 + β(1− α)νc2)Eft τ˜ ct+1
+
µβ
1− β ((1− α)E
F
t pˆit+1 +
αd2
1− βdpˆit−1 −
αβd2
1− βdpˆit)
− b¯
ρ
(z1pˆit + z2pˆit−1 − αβEft pˆit+1) + (
b¯β
ρ
− µβ
1− β )(z1iˆt + z2iˆt−1 − αβE
f
t iˆt+1), (93)
where I follow the assumption that all agents can observe contemporaneous variables when
making their decision (but not yet when forming expectations), and the assumption that
backward-looking agents do not anticipate future shocks.
C.2 Inflation
When T goes to infinity, (73) can be written as
pˆit =ψt + κy1
∞∑
s=0
(c1)
s((1− α)EFt Yˆt+s + αEbt Yˆt+s) (94)
κs
∞∑
s=0
(c1)
s((1− α)EFt sˆt+s + αEbt sˆt+s) + κτ
∞∑
s=0
(c1)
s((1− α)EFt τ˜t+s + αEbt τ˜t+s)
+ κpi1
∞∑
s=1
(c1)
s((1− α)EFt pˆit+s + αEbt pˆit+s) + κξ1
∞∑
s=0
(c1)
s((1− α)EFt ξˆt+s + αEbt ξˆt+s)
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with
ψt =κy2
∞∑
s=0
(c2)
s((1− α)EFt Yˆt+s + αEbt Yˆt+s) + κg
∞∑
s=0
(c2)
s((1− α)EFt g˜t+s + αEbt g˜t+s)
(95)
+ κc
∞∑
s=0
(c2)
s((1− α)EFt τ˜ ct+s + αEbt τ˜ ct+s) + κξ2
∞∑
s=0
(c2)
s((1− α)EFt ξˆt+s + αEbt ξˆt+s)
+ κpi2
∞∑
s=1
(c2)
s((1− α)EFt pˆit+s + αEbt pˆit+s)
Writing one period ahead an taking forward-looking expectations gives
EFt pˆit+1 =E
F
t ψt+1 + κy1
∞∑
s=1
(c1)
s−1((1− α)EFt Yˆt+s + αEFt Ebt+1Yˆt+s) (96)
+ κs
∞∑
s=1
(c1)
s−1((1− α)EFt sˆt+s + αEFt Ebt+1sˆt+s) + κτ
∞∑
s=1
(c1)
s−1((1− α)EFt τ˜t+s + αEFt Ebt+1τ˜t+s)
+
κpi1
1− c1
∞∑
s=2
(c1)
s−1((1− α)EFt pˆit+s + αEFt Ebt+1pˆit+s) + κξ1
∞∑
s=1
(c1)
s−1((1− α)EFt ξˆt+s + αEbt ξˆt+s),
EFt ψt+1 =κy2
∞∑
s=1
(c2)
s−1((1− α)EFt Yˆt+s + αEbt Yˆt+s) + κg
∞∑
s=1
(c2)
s−1((1− α)EFt g˜t+s + αEbt g˜t+s)
+ κc
∞∑
s=1
(c2)
s−1((1− α)EFt τ˜ ct+s + αEbt τ˜ ct+s) + κξ2
∞∑
s=1
(c2)
s−1((1− α)EFt ξˆt+s + αEbt ξˆt+s)
+
κpi2
1− c2
∞∑
s=2
(c2)
s−1((1− α)EFt pˆit+s + αEbt pˆit+s) (97)
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Plugging in expectations of backward-looking agents we can write
pˆit =c1E
F
t pˆit+1 + ψt − c1EFt ψt+1 + κy1(z3Yˆt + z4Yˆt−1 − αc1Eft Yˆt+1) (98)
κs(z3sˆt + z4sˆt−1 − αc1Eft sˆt+1) + κτ (z3τ˜ lt + z4τ˜ lt−1 − αc1Eft τ˜ lt+1)
+ c1κpi1((1− α)EFt pˆit+1 +
αd2
1− c1dpˆit−1 −
αc1d
2
1− c1dpˆit) + κξ1(ξˆt − αc1E
f
t ξˆt+1)
With,
ψt =c2E
F
t ψt+1 + κy2(z5Yˆt + z6Yˆt−1 − αc2Eft Yˆt+1) (99)
+ κg(z5g˜t + z6g˜t−1 − αc2Eft g˜t+1) + κc(z5τ˜ ct + z6τ˜ ct−1 − αc2Eft τ˜ ct+1)
+ c2κpi2((1− α)EFt pˆit+1 +
αd2
1− c2dpˆit−1 −
αc2d
2
1− c2dpˆit) + κξ2(ξˆt − αc2E
f
t ξˆt+1),
z1 = 1− αβ
2d2
1− βd (100)
z2 =
αβd2
1− βd (101)
z3 = 1− αc
2
1d
2
1− c1d (102)
z4 =
αc1d
2
1− c1d (103)
z5 = 1− αc
2
2d
2
1− c2d (104)
z6 =
αc2d
2
1− c2d (105)
D Time varying value functions
When the firm value function is given by (28), log linearizing an updated version of (48)
will give extra terms corresponding to the time variation of the parameters of the value
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function. Inflation equation (55) then becomes
pˆit =
1− ωΠ¯θ−1
ωΠ¯θ−1
[
E¯t
T∑
s=0
((1− c1)(c1)s − (1− c2)(c2)s)
(
Yˆt+s − σCˆt+s − τ˜
c
t+s
1 + τ¯ c
+ ξˆt+s
)
+ E¯t
T∑
s=0
(1− c1)(c1)smˆct+s + E¯t
T∑
s=1
(θ(c1)
s − (θ − 1)(c2)s) pˆit+s (106)
+ E¯t
T∑
s=1
(
θ(c1)
T+1
1− c1 −
(θ − 1)(c2)T+1
1− c2
)
pˆiLRt +
(
(c1)
T+1 − (c2)T+1
) (
Yˆ LRt + λˆ
LR
t
)
+ (c1)
T+1mˆcLRt
]
Similarly, making Λ and long run inflation in the household function time varying
results in two extra terms in Equation (41) which now becomes
b˜it+T+1 =
ub
1− β Cˆ
i
t+T +
ub
(1− β)σ
τ˜ ct+T
1 + τ¯ c
+
ub
(1− β)σE
i
tit+T −
ub
(1− β)σξt+T , (107)
− ubΛ¯
(1− β)C¯(1 + τ¯ c)E
i
tΛˆ
i
t + (b¯−
ub
(1− β)σ )E
i
t pˆi
LR
t
As a result, two additional terms arise at the end of the output equation (72):
(1− νy)Yˆt = 1
ρ
b˜t + gt + ντ
T∑
s=0
βs(E¯tτˆ
l
t+s) + νg
T∑
s=0
βs(E¯tgˆt+s) + νy
T∑
s=1
βs(E¯tYˆt+s)
+ νs
T∑
j=0
βj(E¯tsˆt+j)− µ
T∑
s=1
βs
s∑
j=1
(E¯tit+j−1 − E¯tpˆit+j) + b¯
ρ
T∑
s=0
βs(βE¯tiˆt+s − E¯tpˆit+s) (108)
− β
T+1
1− β
ub
σρ
T−1∑
j=0
(E¯tit+j − E¯tpˆit+j+1)− β
T+1
1− β
ub
σρ
E¯tit+T − L¯SΠ¯
Y¯ ρ
T∑
s=0
βs(E¯tLˆSt+s)
µξξt − µ
T∑
s=1
βsE¯tξt+s + νc1τ˜
c
t + νc2
T∑
s=1
βsE¯tτ˜
c
t+s +
βT+1
1− β
ubΛ¯
C¯(1 + τ¯ c)ρ
Λˆt − β
T+1
ρ
(b¯− ub
(1− β)σ )pˆi
LR
t
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